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The European Union (EU) today possesses capabilities and institutions,
but is still unable to deliver the foreign policies expected owing to a lack of
decision-making procedures capable of overcoming dissent. The EU lacks cohesiveness,
the capacity to make assertive collective decisions and stick to them.
The gap between what the member-states are expected /0 agree on and what they are
actually able to agree upon is both the cause and effect of the ambiguous nature
ofEUforeign policies. Attempts at overcoming the weakness of consensus
policy-making have only marginally improved the consistency and effectiveness
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Consensus-Expectations Gap is
today the main reason why the EU in the foreseeable future will remain a partial
and inconsistent foreign policy actor.
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Why isn't the European Union a greater force
in international politics? In 1993, Christopher Hill
published a seminal article on what he called Eu-
rope's 'capability-expectations gap'. He ana lysed the
international role of the European Community (EC)
and identified a gap between what it had been talked
up to do, and what it was actually able to deliver.
Hill saw the capability-expectations gap as having
three primary components, namely, the ability to
agree, resource availability, and the instruments at
its disposal. I The basic argument presented in this
essay is relatively straightforward: the EU today has
the necessary capabi Iities and institutions, but it is
still unable to deliver the foreign policies expected
of it owing to a lack of decision-making procedures
capable of overcoming dissent. The Union lacks co-
hesiveness, the capacity to make assertive collective
decisions and stick to them. This "consensus-expec-
tations gap" is at the center of why the EU remains a
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partial and inconsistent foreign policy actor.
1. Introduction
In a later reassessment, Hill stressed that the
capability-expectations gap had not been intended
as a static concept, but as a yardstick by wh ich the
process of change in EU foreign policy could be
monitored.' Seeking in some small way to contrib-
ute to this research agenda, this essay will, after out-
lining some of the basics of the capability-expecta-
tions gap argument, examine consensus as a method
of policy-making and point out some of the impl ica-
tions for the EU. The final section deals with some
of the efforts to overcome the 'consensus-expecta-
tions gap'. Consensus is introduced as a conceptual
tool used to select and interpret information. Al-
though it would be senseless to claim that all aspects
of EU foreign policy-making can be understood
through this perspective, it is surprising how many
that can be. The consensus-expectations gap takes
us beyond the state of affairs where academics and
of European Political Cooperation (EPC), but also
for its successors - the CFSP, of which the Euro-
pean Security and Defence Policy (ESOP) is con-
sidered a key component.
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politicians alike have alternated between hailing a
super power in the making, and lambasting the in-
herent futility of its foreign policy efforts. This per-
spective also helps explain the distinct flair of the
EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
2. The Capability-Expectations
Gap
Since the EU is built on consensus govern-
ance and opposition to great power politics, it is far
from obvious that it would be a good idea to pursue
collective foreign and security policies. Hill argues
that the capability-expectations gap is risky because
'it could lead to debates over false possibilities both
within the EU and between the Union and external
supplicants'. Also, it would 'be likely to produce a
disproportionate degree of disillusion and resentment
when hopes were inevitably dashed".' There have
been plenty of ill omens trailing the initiative, most
notoriously when the EU failed to prevent, and later
to stop, the Yugoslav civil wars of the 1990s. Euro-
pean indecision in the face of dissent re-emphasised
a point made by Hedley Bull: 'the power or influ-
ence exerted by the European Community and other
such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic
environment provided by the military power of states,
which they did not control'." Bull argued that if the
Community was ever to be taken seriously in inter-
national affairs, it would need to control credible
power tools.
In his article, Hill directs the reader's atten-
tion to a gap between what the EC had been talked
up to do and what it was able to deliver in terms of
foreign policies, thereby sketching 'a more realistic
picture of what the Community [... ] does in the
world".' As mentioned, Hill's capability-expecta-
tions gap has three main components, namely, cohe-
siveness, resources and operational capacity." He
argued that if the gap is to be closed, the notion of
European foreign policy must be anchored in the
practical capacity to act. Ambition must be grounded
in demonstrated behaviour rather than in potential
and aspirations. To do so the EU requires credible
capabilities. That is, it is not sufficient to simply
amass the tools of power. The actor must also pos-
sess the institutions to mobilise them and the deci-
sion-making mechanisms to command them. The
alternative, of course, is simply to lower expecta-
tions. In the fast-moving world of political science
the concept of the capability-expectations gap has
retained remarkable salience and remains a domi-
nant perspective for monitoring the progress, not only
3. What is Expected from
EU Foreign Policies?
By 2007, the capability-expectations gap has
narrowed considerably. A strong argument can be
made that capabilities and operational capacity are
no longer the primary factors constraining the EU as
a foreign policy actor.' For this limited analysis, the
'expectations' element will be limited to the pros-
pects that the member states themselves have cre-
ated. When trying to identify the EU's foreign policy
goals, the observer will be struck by just how little
serious discussion took place among the member
states during the 1990s over the direction of their
collective foreign and security policies. This was in
no small part due to the difficulties in moving from
a general agreement that the EU should playa role
in world affairs to the specifics of defining policy
objectives, the means by which they were to be at-
tained - and what degree of commitment this would
require on behalf of the member states. The ambi-
guities of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European
Union (TEU) and all subsequent core documents
reflect a quest for language sufficiently vague to con-
tain inherently divergent positions, more than any
clear vision of what a united Europe might achieve
in world affairs.
The Union's lack of a defined self- or a legal
persona, for that matter - is a predicament, since it
impedes self-interested behaviour. The EU defines
itself by values that are taken to be universal and at
the same time particular to Europe." These values
are a blend of proto-liberal and internationalist ide-
als. They are spelt out in detail in the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights: 'The peoples of Europe, in cre-
ating an ever closer union among them, are resolved
to sharing a peaceful future based on common val-
ues', which are listed as 'human dignity, freedom,
equality and solidarity' (defined in 53 subsequent
articles). To these are added 'the principles of de-
mocracy and the rule of law' which, balanced with
individual ism and' free movement of persons, serv-
ices, goods and capital, and the freedom of estab-
lishment', are the building blocks in 'creating an area
of freedom, security and justice'.') Since the EU
makes it clear that these values are held to be uni-
versal, they provide a yardstick of equal relevance
for both internal and external policies. There have
JULY - DECEMBER 2006 121
been attempts to construct something akin to a raison
d'etat out of these values or, more accurately. these
values take up much the same space in EU policies
that in other actors is occupied by national interests.
Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s the
EU focused on pooling military, economic and dip-
lomatic capabilities and assembling institutional
frameworks. Yet the 2003 Iraq crisis made it clear
that no similar progress had been made towards trans-
lating the 'mother and apple pie' values into a con-
sensus on foreign policy means and ends. The 2003
European Security Strategy CESS) is one of the main
strategic documents giving direction to the CFSP.'O
The ESS makes no bones about the EU's ambition
to become a 'global power'. The global aspirations
of the Union are underlined by the fact that the term
is referred to no fewer than 22 times in the ESS and
twice in the opening line of the 20 10 Headline Goal."
Wolfgang Wessels takes the term to refer 'to a state
that is endowed with the traditional attributes of a
large power. or even a super power' .I~ The ambition
to become a purveyor of international order and,
thereby. to establish the EU in the top power league
is reflected in the 'threats and challenges' section of
the strategy. The strategy takes a broad sweep, sin-
gling out not only terrorism but also regional strife,
international crime, failed states and the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction as 'main threats'.
The key threats section is preceded and followed by
an extensive set of 'challenges' spanning issues as
diverse as energy dependence and the resolution of
the Israe l-Palestine conflict."
After having taken on many of the great ques-
tions of the day it comes as something of a letdown
when the ESS makes it clear that the primary means
for tackling these problems will be preventive en-
gageinent and effective multilateralism. The former
tends to refer to the issuing of declarations under the
twin banners of 'critical dialogue' and 'constructive
engagement'. The latter tends to refer to supporting
whatever measures have been agreed upon by the
United Nations (UN). The ESS does not offer even
the roughest guideline as to how economic and mili-
tary tools might be used to exert influence." Here
lies a basic discrepancy between the expectations
raised and the actions taken. The EU can be said to
be a global power only if this term is instilled with a
counter-intuitive meaning. This is not to suggest any
ill-will among the member states, only that their be-
lief in their ability to concur exceeds what the Un-
ion is practicably able to deliver. The chief reason
for this is that the CFSP is governed by the twin pre-
cepts of inter-governmental ism and consensus.
4. The Consensus-Expectations
Gap
Consensus is the element given least attention
in Hill's analysis of the capability-expectations gap.
He appears to simply take for granted the incompat-
ibility of collective leadership and effective foreign
policy-making." In a political context, the Latin ori-
gin of the term is usually taken to mean 'collective
leadership'. Consensus decision-making, that is,
leadership exercised through general agreement,
would seem an attractive idea at first sight. This form
of governance not only seeks the agreement of most
participants, but also tries to moderate the objections
of the minority in order to reach the decision that is
most satisfying for all the parties involved. By this
virtue. consensus decision-making is more concerned
with process than other forms of decision-making.
Consensus is usually understood as both, the gen-
eral agreement as well as the process of arriving at
such an accord. Genuine collective leadership shapes
not only how decisions are made, but also the actual
outcomes. For consensus decision-making to work,
a common agreement must be ernphasised over dif-
ferences in a manner that generates substantive de-
cisions.
Consensus decision-making emphasises dia-
logue to which all participants are invited to provide
input. This is often a protracted process, susceptible
to disruption. Due to the unfiltered input, consensus
policy-making can blur the lines of accountability.
Consensus tends to give organisations a status quo
bias, since the more politicised an issue is, the less
likely is the executive to be able to move beyond
what has already been agreed upon. These traits run
counter to the established hierarchies. effective de-
cision-making procedures and executive powers usu-
ally favoured in foreign policy establishments. For
that reason executives seldom go further than adopt-
ing consensus as the preferred modus operandi, but
not in terms of formal organisation. Most executives
are therefore empowered with mechanisms to over-
come deadlock.
5. Quest for an Effective
Decision-Making Mechanism
The reason why the CFSP is governed by una-
nimity can be captured in a single word: Sover-
eignty. 16 While most member states would like to
carry the weight of 27 states when pursuing their
national positions, they dislike the thought of hav-
ing their own national interest defined by 27 other
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states. The strong 'no deal' bulwark embedded in
the CFSP stops policies from being forced upon dis-
senting states. It is for this reason that foreign and
security policies have been singled out in a separate
'pillar' uneasily tacked on to the European Commu-
nity. In Pillar ll, the EU embraced strict consensus, a
practice which means that each of the 27 members
have an absolute veto over any policy." The sepa-
rate nature of Pillar II interaction dissuades the sort
of issue inter-linkage and horse-trading that would
facilitate Pillar I consensus-building.
Several attempts have been made to overcome
the lowest common denominator bias of the unanim-
ity rule. The 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU)
allows for limited Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)
for certain decisions pertaining to implementation
of CFSP decisions, but such use of QMV must be
authorised by a unanimous vote. This clearly goes
some way towards defeating the purpose. IS The 2007
EU Reform Treaty (that is, the recycled remnants of
the 2003 Constitutional Treaty) retains the unanim-
ity rule." At the same time the treaty states that the
Foreign Affairs Council shall primarily make deci-
sions using QMy'20 In order to understand the impli-
cations of this, it might be instructive to look at the
attempt to revise voting procedures in the 1997
Amsterdam Treaty. Here the members agreed that
QMV could indeed be applied once a 'common strat-
egy' had been agreed by unanimity." Since then,
preciously few such 'common strategies' have been
agreed." In the foreseeable future any hopes ofQMV
as a modus operandi for the CFSP would therefore
seem unlikely.
Introducing 'constructive abstention' was an-
other attempt at breaching the consensus rule. The idea
was to introduce a form of abstention that does not
block adoption of a given decision: to allow states to
simply declare reservations and then stand aside."
Even though the abstaining member state in question
is not obliged to implement the decision, it must re-
frain from any action that might conflict with the
Union's action based on that decision. While construc-
tive abstention would seem a promising way to facili-
tate policymaking, it is not applicable to decisions with
military and defence implications." In addition, if
abstainers make up more than a third of the 'weighted'
votes in the Council, the decision will not be adopted.
There are several ongoing debates regarding alterna-
tive benchmarks of consensus - for example 'unanim-
ity minus one' (or two; or three) to prevent individual
dissenters from blocking policies, or 'rough consen-
sus', i.e. no general imperative for how much consen-
sus is 'adequate'. There have also been discussions
regarding whether the 'emergency brake' can be re-
placed by a delaying mechanism that, for example,
could allow a government to invoke a twelve-month
delay if it felt that its vital national interest was under
threat. There are, however, few signs that any of these
propositions are about to be adopted.
The consensus mechanism more than anything
else gives the CFSP its distinct flair in terms of the
quality and quantity of EU foreign policy. Consen-
sus explains the 'voluntary' foreign policy approach,
where the EU allows itself to cherry-pick among is-
sues on the international agenda, selecting those is-
sues that favour consensus. There is nothing to oblige
EU leaders to take up a subject if it looks as if con-
sensus will be difficult to attain. The resulting in-
consistencies give the EU foreign policy agenda its
distinctly haphazard appearance. The EU will ad-
dress an urgent humanitarian crisis with bland dec-
larations 'calling for', 'urging', and 'inviting' action
while committing armed forces to situations where
the need for coercion is limited. In terms of imple-
mentation the trend is that the lower the level of com-
mitment, the higher the likelihood of achieving con-
sensus. EU foreign policies are generally defined less
by an assessment of the means that are most likely
to deliver the desired result, and more by what tools
can be agreed upon.
Although decision-making by consensus is
slow to adopt coercive policies, the EU states have
generated a cumulative body of common foreign and
security policies. For all its shortcomings, the CFSP
has brought about a sea-change in the practice and
ambience of foreign policy-making. This is due not
least to the fact that the modus operandi of volun-
tary security, combined with the ineffective decision-
making mechanism has proven fertile ground for
bureaucratic politics, where the HR-CFSP, and Coun-
cil and Commission staff play crucial roles in for-
mulating EU foreign and security policies. In an in-
terview, a Council Official stated: 'we are charged
with identifying the issue areas where there is an
overlap in terms of means and ends among the mem-
ber states'. She continued: 'It is our job to play the
role of the honest broker'. Through a blend of
incrementalism and pragmatism, the High Repre-
sentative's staff has played an important, if not widely
acknowledged, role in setting the EU security agenda.
This is the primary reason why EU foreign policies
do not represent the lowest common denominator,
but rather a median of the range of national views."
Frustrated by the lack of progress, .loschka
Fischer introduced the idea that an avant-garde group
then, the list of attempts at common policies that have
been blocked, neutered or derailed by minorities has
grown longer. The consensus-expectations gap is
apparent in the EU approach to virtually all the ma-
jor foreign policy questions of the day, from the hu-
manitarian crisis in Sudan's Darfur region to the
building of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, to
curbing Iran's nuclear aspirations, Turkish accession
and the handling of Russia. The question remains:
How tangible a force should the EU be? Should EU
foreign policies be based on the strength of arms or
the invisible hand of inter-dependence? In the latter
case, the promise of EU membership will continue
to be the most potent policy tool, complemented by
limited pre- and post-crisis management operations.
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of willing and able states should press on with for-
eign policy integration. Such closer cooperation
would allow a group of like-minded states to work
together towards common objectives. The question
is whether this could be achieved within the Union's
existing frameworks. While there has been some
movementtowards facilitating sub-sets ofEU states,
for example through the Battle Group concept, there
is still no agreement on whether this should apply to
policy-making. The 2007 EU Reform Treaty retains
proposals for 'permanent structured cooperation'.
The arrangements for common foreign and security
policy, including those for permanent structured co-
operation in defence, remain substantively unaltered
from the constitutional treaty." Recognising that
some member states are more powerful than others,
the proposal suggested that member states who pos-
sess the military capabilities and commitment be al-
lowed to carry out missions in the name of the EU.
But, although there has always been a degree ofvari-
able geometry within the EU, it is unlikely that any
of the great powers would allow themselves to be
shut out of a weightier EU.
It is important to ernphasise, as Simon Nuttall
does, that 'the system does not operate under a per-
petual threat of veto' .27 The consensus rule owes its
impact not to frequent use, but rather to the possibil-
ity that it represents. CFSP issues are rarely voted
upon. The prejudice against actual voting in CFSP
affairs has the obvious benefit of avoiding drawing
attention to fissures. On the other hand, the low yield-
making mechanism has encouraged the forming of
informal directorates, notably the EU-3 (comprising
Germany, France and Britain) which has become
increasingly central in the EU foreign policy-mak-
ing process. The former EU Commissioner for Ex-
ternal Relations, Chris Patten, put this in plain terms:
'I mean no disrespect to other states but there is no
European policy on a big issue unless France, Ger-
many and Britain are on side.:" In reality a single
member state or even a coalition of smaller member
states would find it very difficult to hold out if the
EU-3 were in agreement. The argument can be made
that the consensus-expectations gap is primarily
between Berlin, Paris and London. Should the three
choose to act in conceit they could playa determin-
ing role in the European Union's Foreign Policy.
6. Where to Now?
In 2000, Simon Nuttall concluded that the
policy benefits from the various attempts at modify-
ing the consensus rule had been 'marginal' .29 Since
As noted initially, Chris Hill warned of the
inherent dangers of the capabi lity-expectations gap
because this could lead to debates over false possi-
bilities, and also be likely to produce resentment
when hopes were inevitably dashed. Is this not a fair
description of the EU and the 2003 Iraq crisis? The
point was not whether or not the Iraq question was
within the scope of the CFSP, but rather that the peo-
ples of Europe had expected the EU to do - or say-
something. Instead of siding with the peoples against
the nation states, the EU mandarins studiously
avoided the question, keeping their heads down, busy
with the Constitutional Treaty. As a result widespread
disenchantment with American policies failed to
translate into support for the EU - or indeed, the
Constitutional Treaty. Over the Iraq question the EU
missed what was likely a one-off opportunity to add
substance to the Union.
The Union has come some way towards be-
coming a regional pacifier (keeping the peace in the
Balkans) and a bridge between the rich and the poor
(as illustrated in the recent World Trade Organisa-
tion negotiations); and ajoint supervisor of the world
economy (the euro is now the world's second most
important currency). If expectations were to be
brought into sync with reality, that is, if the 'global
power' aspiration were done away with, then the EU
would still have a foreign policy dimension to speak
of. The question is whether this is a viable option -
or is the consensus-expectations gap already too
wide? It is fair to assume that given its high visibil-
ity the CFSP will be closely linked to the overall
popular support for European integration. Even with
a scaled-down level of ambition the EU will COIl-
tinue to operate in a strategic environment provided
by the military power of states, which it does not
control. The consensus-expectations gap is set to
continue to prevent the EU from engaging in effec-
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tive crisis management. leaving the Europeans to pick
up the pieces after any conflict has burnt itself out.
The gap between what the mern ber states are ex-
pected to agree upon and what they are actually able
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